The urgency is well-founded. Currently, most of East Africa’s refined petroleum products are sourced from the Middle East and transported through the Strait of Hormuz. The Strait’s effective closure since early March 2026, following Iran’s blockade in response to US and Israeli military strikes, has disrupted supply chains across the region. Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, Rwanda, and their neighbors have all reported higher pump prices, supply shortages, and growing pressure on transport and manufacturing sectors that depend entirely on liquid fuels.
Uganda’s government has taken a different approach to the energy security challenge, controversially pushing through the Protect of National Sovereignty Bill of 2026 despite sharp criticism from opposition lawmakers and civil society groups. State Minister for Internal Affairs David Muhoozi and Attorney General Kiryowa Kiwanuka both defended the legislation, stating it aims to safeguard Uganda’s political independence from foreign interference in its electoral and governance processes. Critics, however, argue the bill targets political opponents rather than genuine foreign interference, and that existing laws already address the concerns the government cites
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Kenya’s President William Ruto has faced domestic pressure over fuel prices throughout the year, with opposition leaders and trade unions arguing that the government is not doing enough to shield ordinary citizens from the global energy shock. Ruto has publicly defended the pricing levels, attributing them to the country’s infrastructure demands and economic development trajectory. His administration has simultaneously accelerated dialogue with Gulf state energy suppliers about alternative supply routes that bypass the Strait of Hormuz.
The broader challenge for East African economies is one of structural energy insecurity that predates the current crisis but has been dramatically exposed by it. The region lacks significant refining capacity, meaning it must import finished petroleum products rather than crude oil, making its supply chains longer and more vulnerable to disruption at any point in the global logistics network. Building domestic refining capacity has been a policy priority for years, but progress has been slow due to the massive capital investment required.
The Mozambique situation illustrates the wider financing challenge facing African governments. The IMF is planning to send a team to Maputo in June to continue discussions on a new loan program, with the country struggling under rising debt, a contracting economy, and inadequate resources to fund essential public services. The contrast between Mozambique’s fiscal stress and the Democratic Republic of Congo’s Eurobond success this week, where investor demand for DRC bonds was four times greater than the supply, highlights the growing divergence within Africa between resource-rich nations attracting global capital and others falling deeper into debt dependency.
The African Development Bank and the International Monetary Fund have both projected that sub-Saharan African growth will hold around 3 to 4 percent in 2026 despite the external shocks from the Iran war and global energy disruption.
That is a measure of real resilience, driven by demographic growth, expanding digital economies, and rising intraregional trade. But the AfDB has also warned that without faster progress on energy security, infrastructure investment, and governance quality, the continent’s growth potential will continue to be constrained by exactly the kinds of external vulnerabilities now being exposed.
For ordinary East Africans, the pipeline project and the policy debates in regional capitals feel distant from the daily reality of paying more for fuel, transport, and food. The crisis is a reminder that Africa’s integration into global commodity markets brings both opportunity and exposure, and that the investments needed to reduce that exposure have for too long remained at the planning stage rather than the construction stage.
